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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. Executive Secretary

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•				Smith-Semenov Post-Plenary Conversation, November 21, 1972.						
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: November 21, 1972

TIME: 4:15 to 4:30 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva

A- 6

SUBJECT: Smith-Semenov Post-Plenary Conversation

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Interpreter

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov Mr. A. V. Bratchikov, Interpreter Mr. E. N. Kochetkov,

Minister Semenov remarked that Ambassador Smith had rather correctly noted that on a number of questions we would have to refer back to discussions that had taken place before May 20, 1971. However, if he had understood today's U.S. statement correctly, the U.S. position contained some elements that had not been present at that time.

Ambassador Smith said that in our review since May we had come to see this question, the need for equality in levels of ICBMs and capabilities of ICBMs, in a clearer light than before May 1971. He believed that Semenov would find we were reaching for a degree of stability between the two strategic forces which we believed could only come if both sides had equal numbers of ICBMs and if the ICBM forces had the same capabilities.

Semenov said that here evidently we were entering into the sphere of determining the composition of strategic offensive armaments, which he believed Smith would agree was the determining factor in terms of solving problems in the area of more comprehensive limitation of strategic armaments as a whole.

Smith said that if he had understood correctly what Semenov had said, and he believed he had, he could agree. He believed it important that we not try to design each others force structures. He thought we should be aiming for a legal ceiling where each side designed its own forces within that ceiling. We should be searching for a legal structure where if either side wanted to have the same number of a given weapons system as the other, it would be free to do so, because when we were dealing with large differences in numbers, this would tend to a non-stable situation.

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Semenov said that these questions as well as some others would be the subject of our discussions in the next few days or during the next month. He thought that when Smith had spoken about preparing a work program for the future phases of our negotiations, he had in mind that we would exchange views on a number of questions of strategic offensive arms limitations. Personally, he considered such an exchange of views to be important; it would enable us, he hoped, to attempt to identify common ground between our positions, the direction in which our negotiations should be moving as well as the key issues for further discussion.

Smith said it was his hope that before we finished this first session of SALT Two, we would be able to come up with a list of issues to be examined more carefully at the next session, just as we had done during our preliminary initial session at the beginning of SALT I in Helsinki. Hopefully this list will be more precise than we had come up with in Helsinki and would enable us to focus on hard questions more precisely.

Semenov said that the Helsinki list would be "unrepeatable" in any case, if only because a number of the issues listed had already been resolved. The Helsinki agenda had contained four points which had since been covered by four agreements, or rather three permanent agreements and one interim agreement. Of course, Smith was right when he had said that our central task consisted in negotiating a treaty for the limitation of strategic offensive arms. In the private meeting earlier that day Semenov had also mentioned some other aspects which he believed would be of mutual interest.

Smith said that he had noted that, and was especially interested in Semenov's reference to possible restraints. This was a new concept and if Semenov could amplify it now or subsequently, that would help our understanding.

Semenov thought this could be done somewhat later. He said that at our next meeting he believed he would be able to present some considerations regarding Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission and would perhaps also be able to name Soviet representatives for the working group that both sides had in mind establishing for this purpose.

Smith said he, too, would try to be prepared by Friday to give Semenov our views on the Standing Consultative Commission, as well as a list of U.S. representatives for the working group.

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Semenov remarked that this was very good; it meant that we had made a good start in our work here. As he understood it, we were now at a stage of presenting general positions for the new stage of negotiations and that in itself represented a concrete move on our part. Smith's statement today contained a few elements he would like to return to at the next meeting, after having had a chance to consider them in detail. Smith said that he would be interested in obtaining Semenov's reaction.

Semenov said that he had with great interest observed Smith's activities in connection with justification of the SALT agreements at various levels in the United States. On his side this work had been assumed by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and thus his job had been easier. Smith asked if Semenov had seen the transcripts of the proceedings in the various Committees in which Smith had appeared in June and July. Semenov said that he had followed these proceedings very carefully.

WK prilled

Drafted by: WDKrimer:leb:res

November 21, 1972

Approved by: Ambassador Gerard C. Śmith

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